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The main force driving the economy in the next ten years will
be information-based technology, including computers, factory automation, and communication systems for home and business.' Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) and Paperless Entry Payment (PEP)
systems will become increasingly prevalent. Those systems can
transfer data and information relating to financial transactions
through a series of communication networks. For example, a transaction may begin with the entry of data at the point-of-sale or transfer and culminate in computerized bookkeeping at a depository
financial institution many miles away. Unlike the present paperbased system, transfers or payments under an EFT/PEP system
will be electronic. Electronic or electromagnetic impulses will be
transmitted from terminal to terminal, computer to computer, utilizing thousands of miles of wire, microwave carriers and satellite
transmitters. These transmission systems will be used to enhance
the financial services products and to relay data and information regarding funds transfers and payment transactions.
Electronic financial services also may be provided by non-financial enterprises. Large brokerage firms offer "customer financial
management accounts" against which checks may be written or
credit card purchases charged. Further, several large retailing organizations and private money-order companies offer payment and
1. U.S.

NEWS

& WoRLD REP., Feb. 13, 1984, at 57.
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transfer of funds services. The trend is toward homogenization of financial institutions, with depository institutions becoming increasingly similar in transfer of funds, payment powers, and in the rules
by which they compete. Conversely, financial institutions are also
offering new kinds of financial services (e.g., discount brokerage and
insurance). The line between the financial and nonfinancial sector
is blurring.
Financial services and payment systems entered the electronic
age in the 1960s. Third generation computer systems and advanced
telecommunication systems made large data-bases readily available
to users at remote locations. Costs of data conversion and storage
dropped rapidly and software became more sophisticated and reliable. The result was a transformation in the handling of financial
data for both individuals and organizations. New technology is causing a revolutionary change in the processing of financial transactions and in the communication of information, spawning a myriad
of new financial service products. Among these are certificateless
2
securities and "book entry" electronic systems for their handling,
3
cash management and financial planning services, and Videotex.
Advancing electronic technology and rapid development of new
financial products and services increase the exposure of serviceproviders to risk and monetary losses. Total computer fraud losses
are estimated to average between $3 billion and $5 billion a year. 4 In
electronic funds transfers, loss may occur from unauthorized access
to funds, internal theft, external eavesdropping, fraud from intruders and electronic interceptors, and errors and omissions caused by
employees or agents. Figures suggest losses from fraud at automated cash withdrawal machines are currently nowhere near that
experienced by credit card issuers. This is due in part to personal
identification numbers, daily cash withdrawal limits, and the limited
2. The "book entry" system is a method of storage and representation of financial assets (e.g., bonds and other debt securities) through electronic data processing
systems that record everything from bank account balances to investment securities.
No physical security is ever issued; transfer, settlement and delivery for buying and
selling purposes is done electronically.
3. Videotex is an embryonic application of new technology promising a new medium for transmitting information from a host computer to a television set or personal computer, giving the consumer/user home access to shopping, library services,
banking and other financial transaction services, and a wide variety of electronic services (e.g., business statistics, commercial information, news, stock prices), from distant computer information data bases.
4. Brouillette, In.surance Coverage for Computers Too Unspecific, Conference
Told, Am. Banker, Feb. 2, 1984 at 3, col. 3.
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number of automated cash withdrawals. 5
Litigation involving electronic financial transactions is frequently based on contract-related disputes (e.g., scope of service,
warranties, disclaimers, and limitations or remedies), common law
fraud (e.g., misrepresentation), negligence (failure to act reasonably
so as not to damage others), and other torts. Although these areas
of the law have old and well established roots, the law with regard
to computer service products has developed only recently. The litigation generally concerns the computer product resulting from the
capability of computer systems to access, analyze, process, summarize, and report data and information. As always, when old legal
principles are used to meet new needs, problems and ambiguities
arise. The resulting patchwork of statutes and case law lags far behind the new and developing needs of society.
This Article examines the legal repercussions of electronic financial services and transactions and the effect of the movement by
society into an environment where financial service products will be
provided without paper. The treatment of the problems is not exhaustive. The conclusions offered are tentative, an appropriate posture since so many facets of electronic financial transaction services
are as yet undeveloped. Nevertheless, the legal problems presented
by paperless entry or fund transfer systems and electronic banking
are of some immediacy, because these systems will fundamentally
alter current patterns of business practice. Electronic financial services will change the way in which financial institutions deal with
their customers, and will change the existing competitive balance
among financial and nonfinancial providers of services. Important
and difficult regulatory and legal questions are presented. Also, because EFT and PEP will generate an expanded and more easily accessible data-base of information regarding the behavior of citizens,
significant constitutional questions will arise.
EFT and PEP systems exploiting data processing and communications technology for electronic transfer of funds and other financial transactions emerged in the early 1970s. EFT and PEP are
mechanisms for processing value exchanges (debit or credit orders)
using properly instructed electronic equipment, interfaced to various institutions through switching centers and facilitators. Bank
check processing and collection is the keystone of paper-based payments and transfer of funds and remains one of the most important
routine services of commercial banks. 6 Spurred by the mounting
5. Tyson, On-Line Discount Broker Expects A Rush of Competition From Banks,
Am. Banker, Feb. 21, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
6. During 1982, 37.7 billion checks for $29.3 trillion were processed by the bank-
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problems of transporting, processing, accounting, and storing the paper generated in the check payment system, financial institutions
have increasingly utilized electronic computer technology to process
checks and deposits and to increase customer accessibility to money
transaction information.7 The computer has thus fundamentally altered the delivery and processing of financial services by making
possible electronic funds transfers and paperless entry transactions.
This has created legal issues and transitional relationships among
the participants (e.g. consumer and other customers, institutional
providers of financial services, vendors of goods and services, telecommunication utilities, facilitiators and switches).
EFT and PEP are properly viewed not only as systems for delivery of a new variety of electronic financial services, but also as alternatives to paper-based means of transferring funds and making
payments. The introduction of debit cards, "In-Home" banking services, and electronic shopping will eventually slow check usage, but
check usage will continue to expand at a fairly steady rate throughout the next decade. The "cashless/less-checks" society that futurists predicted in the 1960's is still a few decades away.
Existing microcomputer, data processing, and telecommunication technology is more than adequate to support a vast array of
electronic financial service products for quasi- self-service banking.
This technology has given rise to delivery innovations for providing
financial transaction services. Among these are: (1) Automated
Teller Machines (ATMs); 8 (2) point-of-sale (POS) terminals; 9
ing system. Of these, it is estimated 36.7 billion, totalling $4.6 trillion, were used for
retail payments, contrasted to 5 billion credit card charge slips totalling $208 billion.
Business check payments numbered 370 million totalling $18.5 trillion, while the U.S.
Treasury issued 655 million checks for $629 billion. Letter from the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland to James V. Vergari (Aug. 10, 1983).
7. In a pure paperless entry payments (PEP) and electronic funds transfer
(EF ) environment, physical deposit and collection processing of checks would be
replaced by a series of electrical impulses communicated between computers that
would read and process the information and instructions, and transfer the funds from
institution to institution and from the drawer/remitter to the authorized recipient
while performing the necessary transmission and deposit accounting functions. Payment and debit/credit entries would be almost instantaneous, and no paper would
need to be produced. Plastic access cards and paperless payment entries are not
cash nor its equivalent. They are simply substitutes for checks and cash in payment
transactions: a form of "electronic" or "computer" money. The computer cannot verify the drawer's signature or the authorized user of jhe plastic access card, unless the
related personal characteristics are pre-stored in the related data base and communicated at the time of use.
8. Unattended facilities consisting of intelligent terminals (ATMs or other remote service/transaction units), installed either on the premises or elsewhere, give a
financial institution the means through which its customers with authorized access

182
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(4) electronic debit cards;"
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(5) "In-Home"

devices and valid user identification can withdraw cash, make deposits, inquire about
account balances, move funds from one account to another, and make payments on
loans or credit card accounts, all without human intervention. Shared ATM networks
permit authorized customers to withdraw money at other ATMs or POS terminals on
the network in which their account institution is a member. NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFERS FINAL REPORT, Appendix C at 345 (hereinafter cited
as NCEFT).
9. POS terminals are designed to receive information concerning payment or
transfer of funds and transmit that information from the unattended terminal, usually located in a retail establishment, to the financial institution's main computer.
Thus, with the proper plastic access card (e.g., credit card, debit card) and the required (secret) customer/user identification, data entered at the POS can be recorded at the account institution, debiting the customer's account and crediting the
retailer's account for the transaction. The purchase effected through the POS terminal is completed with the finality of a cash transaction. The POS facility may also be
used by the retailer to retrieve data concerning the related transaction for the operational needs of the business enterprise where the terminal is situated. It may also be
used for cash withdrawals from the user's account at the issuer institution. POS terminals can also be used for processing check authorization or verification cards and
for credit card charges or inquiries. POS terminals provide many convenient ways
for the customer to buy goods and services. Functionally, the POS terminal replaces
the cash register. A POS debit card transaction results in a direct debit to the demand deposit or transaction account at the buyer/user's financial institution, similar
to a check or ATM transaction. Id. at 341.
10. Banking-by-phone service includes bill paying and other financial transactions performed using the telephone. A customer, generally a consumer, by prearrangement with a financial institution offering a telephone bill-paying service, uses a
telephone and an appropriate identification code to instruct the financial institution
to transfer funds from his or her account to the account of the designated creditors.
In most cases, the customer communicates directly with the institution's computer,
utilizing the various frequencies produced by a push-button telephone. Id. at 345.
11. The electronic debit card is the electronic heir apparent to the personal
check, and the next step in the evolution of an electronic payment mechanism. Debit
cards ("computer money") are required to access ATMs, POS terminals, and other
EFT mechanisms in order to withdraw cash or transfer immediately available funds.
The parties involved in an electronic debit card transaction are: the customer/user;
recipient (e.g., vendor, service or professional groups) who accepts the debit card as a
cash payment for the transaction; the facilitator (the service unit or switch involved
in the telecommunication process); and the payor financial institution which issued
the debit card.
At present, many debit card transactions are not entirely electronic: a paper
charge or debit order is produced and used as input to complete the transaction.
Electronic debit cards access the cardholder's demand deposit account rather than a
line of credit as with a credit card. Thus more care should be taken with debit card
transactions than with credit card transactions. Error as to one's credit is less serious than error as to amounts in one's bank accounts. Garson, Debit Cards Spur MasterCard Push on Payments Network, Am. Banker, May 4, 1983, at 14, col. 1. A debit

card is similar in nature to a check as a funds transfer or payment device. The confidential code or personal identification number (PIN) for use with the debit card to
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financial services; 12 (6) domestic and international transfer of
funds;13 (7) automatic clearing house (ACH) facilities for exchange
and clearance of paperless-entry debits and credits;14 (8) telecomaccess the demand deposit account to transfer funds or make payments is analogous
to the drawer's signature on a check.
An evolving type of electronic debit card is the "smart card," a plastic card with a
computer microchip imbedded in it, which offers a different set of advantages and
protections than one without a microchip. The main advantage is security. The
smart card draws its power from the imbedded microprocessor chip that can be read
by an intelligent terminal when the card is inserted in the reader device. In effect,
the smart card is a small computer that can remember balances or purchases and can
store and update information such as financial and medical history. French banks
originally developed the smart card as a replacement for checkbooks. At present, it is
being used as the payment medium for pay telephones in France, and at POS terminals as a substitute for cash payments. Trigaux, InternationalStandards Draftedfor
'Smart' Card, Am. Banker, May 31, 1984, at 1, col. 2; Young, What's Happening With

Smart Cards?,MAG. OF BANK AD., Jan. 1984, at 28-30.
12. In-Home financial services (e.g., "Home Banking", Videotex) usually are performed over cable television facilities as an interactive service in which the user's financial account information is accessed as well as a variety of commercial data bases.
Among the services usually offered in addition to home banking are shopping-athome, news and weather reports, restaurant listings, library research, and financial
statistics. A microchip access card coded with the user's signature characteristic may
be a way to solve the problem of personal identification for Home Banking Services.
Tyson, Chip Card Might Solve Home Banking's Id, Am. Banker, May 17, 1984, at 3, col.

2. Home banking could increase significantly if the number of home computers grows
as rapidly as predicted. Computer-based home financial services are the next step in
electronic financial service products. Further, the Federal Reserve Board stated that
home banking terminals did not have to produce a terminal receipt under the Electronic Funds Transfer Act. This will spur the growth of home banking. Still, it is generally agreed that it will be years before home banking or videotex will be a
significant factor in the payments or transfer of funds area. Garson, Consortium Will
Test Home Banking, Am. Banker, May 19, 1983, at 3, col. 1, NCR Universal Credit
Union Claims a First with Home Banking Services, Am. Banker, Aug. 24, 1983, at 10,

col. 1.
13. Transfers of funds over domestic and international "wire" systems (e.g.,
FEDWIRE, BANKWIRE, CHIPS, SWIFT) are generally interbank or corporate transfers of high dollar amounts for the bank's own account or that of third parties, and
are now effected electronically by means of debits or credits to the demand deposit
accounts of the parties at the participating financial institutions. See S.E.C. v. Miller,
495 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
14. An automated clearing house (ACH) is an association of financial institutions
whose operations functionally parallel check clearinghouse operations, except that in
an ACH the payment data is processed and exchanged electronically. ACH computerized facilities receive, process and distribute magnetic tape or other machine-readable data. This data is received from participating financial institutions in groups of
paperless entries (debits and credits). These entries can be used for electronic exchange, clearance, transfer of funds, and settlement of the total debits and credits of
each institution at a designated financial institution such as a Federal Reserve Bank.
An ACH is designed to facilitate the electronic processing of recurring payment
credits (e.g., social security payments and other government disbursements, payrolls,
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munication of information and data from check truncation; 15 electronic Giro and other recurring transactions;1 6 (9) check guarantee
plans; and (10) the electronic processing of paper entries from credit
card transactions and from electronic credit cards.
The development and use of national standards are of great importance to efficient and secure processing of electronic financial
transactions, but use of these standards is voluntary in the United
States. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is the
clearinghouse and coordinating body for standards activity on the
national level. It also represents U.S. interests in international standards development which is coordinated by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). EFT systems encompass data
processing, communications, banking, and retailing. Universal standards in these areas will allow consistency in record formats, physical specifications and characteristics, location of fields, numbering
systems, and data elements. Standards and record formats are vital
to critical areas in the EFT/PEP design, communication and
17
processing.
Some legal disputes arising from electronic financial services
and transactions may involve:
corporate transfers), preauthorized debits from a demand deposit account (e.g., insurance premium remittances, periodic mortgage payments, utility bill payments,
business trade payments), and other paperless direct debits and credits. NCEFT, Appendix C, supra note 8, at 339.
15. The cumbersome processing and shipment of checks, with the related paperlisting of data and information, eventually may be replaced by "check truncation"
[i.e., the interception and retention of the actual checks or other items (defined in
U.C.C. § 4-104(1)(g))] at some point in the check collection process. The data and information needed for interbank clearing and settlement, presentment, payment or
dishonor, and accounting at the payor bank will be captured, processed, and telecommunicated to the designated destination of the check or other item. The paperless
entries for the truncated items may be cleared and exchanged through an ACH or
ACH network. See Vergari, Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code in an
Electronic Fund Transfer Environment, 17 SAN DIEGO L REv. 287, 288 (1980).
16. In electronic Giro transactions the payment instructions and funds move from
the remitter to the recipient by electronic telecommunication. The Giro entry is a
credit transfer, moving funds from the remitter's financial institution on the specified
payment date to the recipient's designated financial institution. To receive a Giro remittance, the recipient must designate the financial institution and account data to
which the remittance/payment is to be transferred. Electronic Giro will be useful in
making recurring types of remittances or payments on consumer utility bills, insurance premiums, periodic mortgage payments, or business trade payments, where the
remitter wants to retain control over the time when the payment or transfer of funds
is initiated. For further discussion, see Vergari, Electronic Girofor the United States,
2 COMPUTER L.J. 101, 102-04 (1980).
17. NCEFT, supra note 8, at 170-74. See, Trigaux, InternationalStandardsDrafted
For Smart Card, Am. Banker, May 31, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
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(1) Rights and duties of participants;
(2) allocation of risks for unauthorized transfers, errors, and malfunctions in the computer system;
(3) liability of outside processors, communications carriers, or
providers of switching facilities or data processing services;
(4) violation of individuals' privacy rights;
(5) fraud, theft, and other computer abuses;
(6) whether off-premise ATMs and other customer-bank communication terminals or unattended facilities are branch offices
and/or unapproved bank expansion; and
(7) violation of antitrust or anticompetitive rules from joint EFT
activities (e.g., operation of automated clearinghouses, sharing
of ATMs and/or POS terminals and networks of terminals, access restrictions to central switching facilities, and restrictions
limiting access to supporting communication facilities).
I. LEGAL STRUCTURE
The legal structure for electronic fihancial services and transactions presently is based on private contracts and federal statutes, including agreements among financial institutions and/or service
providers, ACH operation rules, 18 Federal Reserve Regulation J
20
is(Wire Transfers),19 and Regulation E (Electronic Transfers)
sued pursuant to the Electronic Funds Transfer Act of 1978
(EFTA) 2 1 and authorization agreements or standing orders between
customers and creditors or employers and employees. These contracts and rules allocate risk for events that may occur in a given
transaction, such as fraud, mistake, negligence, malfunction, or error. There are also rules regarding the payment and settlement of
various electronic financial transactions.
A.

FEDERAL LAw CONCERNING ELECTRONIC FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS

1. Electronic Funds Transfer Act
The Congressional purpose of the Electronic Funds Transfer
Act (EFTA) was "to provide a basic framework establishing the
rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in electronic
fund transfer systems. '22 This goal was achieved only to the extent
18. NATIONAL AUTOMATED CLEARING HousE ASSOCIATION OPERATING RULES

ed. 1979).
19. 12 C.F.R.
20. 12 C.F.R.
21. Title XX
1693r (1982).
22. 15 U.S.C.

(rev.

§§ 210.25-210.38 (1981).
§ 205 (1982).
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693§ 1693(b) (1982).
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of providing consumers with protection and rights in EFT transactions analogous to those available in similar circumstances under
existing consumer protection laws. EFTA relies heavily upon the
principle of comprehensive disclosure. It also allocates risks and liabilities between the consumer and the institutional provider of EFT
services, in such matters as the institution's failure to respond correctly to the consumer's instruction, losses caused by an unauthorized access to a consumer's account, and procedures for resolving
disputes concerning alleged errors.
Exemptions include: 23 transactions originated by check, draft,
or similar paper instrument; check guarantee or authorization that
does not result directly in a debit or credit to a consumer's account;
transactions through FEDWIRE, BANKWIRE, or any similar network servicing financial institutions and businesses; and telephonic
transfer of funds initiated by a conversation between a consumer
and a financial institution. 24 Check truncation is not covered as the
25
transfer is initiated by a check.
The EFTA requires EFT providers to disclose to consumers key
information about their rights and liabilities; 26 to provide consumers
with paper documentation of transfers and error correction procedures; 2 7 and to limit a consumer's liability for losses resulting from
computer fraud and unauthorized access to the consumer's account
(generally $50).28 For example, under EFTA, a customer's potential
liability for unauthorized electronic transfers may not exceed $50 if
the financial institution is notified within two business days of the
discovery of the loss or theft of an EFT access card. After two days,
the customer's liability limit increases to $500. Failure to notify the
financial institution within 60 days after an account statement is
sent removes the ceiling on liability for unauthorized transactions.
The financial institution has the burden of proving either that the
transfer was authorized or that the customer failed to notify on
time.
The Federal Reserve Board was authorized 29 to promulgate regulations to implement EFTA (i.e., Regulation E-Electronic Funds
Transfer 3°). Administrative enforcement responsibilities are allocated among the federal regulatory agencies that normally oversee
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693a(6)(A)-(E) (1982).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(7) (1982).

25. 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(g) (1984).
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

15
15
15
15
12

U.S.C. §§ 1693c(a) (1)- (5), 1693c(b) (1982).
U.S.C. §§ 1693c(a) (6), 1693f (1982).
U.S.C. § 1693g (1982).
U.S.C. § 1693b (1982).
C.F.R. § 205 (1982).

LATENT LEGAL REPERCUSSIONS

1984]

187

31

the operations of the regulated parties.
EFTA preempts state law only to the extent that protection pro32
vided to the consumer is greater than that afforded by state law.
The Federal Reserve Board has been delegated the responsibility of
33
evaluating whether federal or state law applies in such situations.
If no specific determination is made, the state provision remains in
force.
Under EFTA and Federal Reserve Regulation E-Electronic
Transfers, the telephone is not deemed an electronic device. By
analogy, "Home Banking" transfers may be exempt, raising questions as to duties and obligations concerning transfer of funds or
payment orders executed on home equipment via telecommunication media (e.g., cable TV lines), and as to the rules when home
banking transactions are made by means of computers interacting
over cable TV lines. These questions will be compounded when a
computer user operates an "In-Home" financial service apparatus to
access both personal and business accounts. Until recently, "InHome" financial services were deemed "electronic terminals," which
34
under EFTA must generate and deliver a receipt to the customer.
Customers considering "In-Home" banking would have been required to buy an expensive printer to produce a receipt for the
transaction. However, the Federal Reserve Board staff has interpreted EFTA to exempt home terminals from the rule, reasoning
that using a home35terminal is like using a telephone, which does not
require a receipt.
Truth-in-Lending Act

2.

The Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) 36 requires creditors to disclose in writing to the debtor in a consumer credit transaction information concerning the "annual percentage rate" and "finance
charge"; 3 7 a periodic statement of the credit transactions, including
written notice of any change in terms; 38 and. two copies of the notice
of the right to rescind certain consumer credit transactions. 39 TILA
applies even in electronically executed consumer credit
transactions.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

15
15
15
15
12
15
12
12
12

U.S.C. §§ 1693c, 1693o (1982).
U.S.C. §§ 1693q, 1693r (1982).
U.S.C. § 1693q (1982).
U.S.C. § 1693a(7) (1982).
C.F.R. § 205, Supp. II 2-23 (1982).
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665a (1982).
C.F.R. § 226.6 (1982).
C.F.R. § 226.7 (1982).
C.F.R. § 226.9 (1982).
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FairCredit Billing Act

The Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA) 4° imposes a duty on creditors, if certain specified conditions exist, to correct billing errors on
customer statements. This includes statements of credit cardholders and errors as to extensions of credit. 41 Most creditors, including
credit card issuers, provide customers with a disclosure form showing the consumer's billing rights and procedures to be followed in
the event a customer thinks the billing is wrong, together with the
creditor's responsibility under the FCBA. 42 These requirements
also apply to electronic financial transactions.
B.

PROPOSED UNIFORM NEW PAYMENTS CODE

(NPC)

Electronic funds transfers, paperless entry payments, and other
paperless financial transactions provide a modern and convenient
method to conduct business. They are not subsumed by existing
law governing older, more traditional, paper-based methods such as
checks. 43 As a result, a payment or transfer of funds transaction
might have very different legal consequences depending upon the
method chosen: paper, paperless, or electronic. To combat this discrepancy, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code is drafting a Uniform New Payments Code (NPC). The
latest draft" indicates that the NPC would apply to all forms of payment and transfer of funds except cash. All forms of payments including credit cards, check guarantee plans, and "In-Home" banking
transactions would have the same legal effect and bear the same
legal consequences. 45 The relevant legal issues include not only the
specific rights and obligations of the parties for computer and telecommunication of transfers of funds and payment orders, but also
the broader issues of privacy, security, theft, and unauthorized use
of access devices and illegal entry in the telecommunication media.
C.

STATE STATUTES REGULATING ELECTRONIC FINANCIAL SERVICES
AND TRANSACTIONS

Thirty-two states have enacted laws that expressly regulate the
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (1982).
41. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13 (1982).
42. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(d) (1982).
43. See Vergari, Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code In An Electronic Funds Transfer Environment, 17 SAN DIEGO L REv. 287 (1980).
44. Permanent Editorial Board draft no. 3, June 2, 1983, available at the Board,
4025 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.
45. For a critique, see Vergari, A Critical Look At the Uniform New Payments
Code, 9 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 317 (1983).
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establishment and use of EFT systems.4 The statutes permit limited area (e.g., city, or one or more counties), or statewide offering of
EFr services. Three other states, without statutes framed to directly regulate EFT, are likely to have regulations governing electronic financial transactions issued by the state's financial
47
institutions regulatory agency under its general regulatory powers.
Some state laws have provisions regarding the sharing of ATM/POS
terminals within the state, ranging from the extreme of mandatory
sharing in Connecticut and Nebraska to permissive sharing in New
York. A state's sharing law may have an impact on a financial institution's participation in a network, especially since some states have
outright prohibition of an out-of-state financial institution's use of
ATMs within its borders.48
Some state laws permit: (a) customers of out-of-state banks access to EFT services; 49 (b) out-of-state banks to offer EFT services
46. Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-367 to 67-367.10 (1980); California, CA. FIN.
CODE §§ 550-561 (West Supp. 1984); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-6.5-101 to -111
(Supp. 1983); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-193(a)-(h) (Supp. 1983); Delaware,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 770 (Supp. 1982); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.65 (West Supp.
1984); Idaho, Electronic Fund Transfer Transmission Facility Act §§ 1-100 to 14-100,
IDAHO CODE § 26-309 (Supp. 1983); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, §§ 1305-1343 (SmithHurd Supp. 1983-84); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 524.803(1), 524.821, 527.1-.12 (West
Supp. 1983-1984); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1111 (1982); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9-B, §§ 131, 334 (1975 & Supp. 1982); Maryland, MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 5-502
(1980 & Supp. 1983); Massachusetts, MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 1147, § 64 (West 1983);
Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 488.1 - 488.31 (West Supp. 1984-85); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 47.61-47.65 (West Supp. 1984); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 362.108
(Vernon Supp. 1984); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 32-6-101 to -402 (1983); Nebraska,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-157 (1977); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-19 (West Supp.
1983); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-16-1 to 17 (Supp. 1983); New York, N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 105-a (McKinney Supp. 1983-84); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 53-62 (1983); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-02 (Supp. 1983); Oklahoma,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 422 (West Supp. 1983); Oregon, O& REV. STAT. §§ 706.005,
714.200-270, 716.645 (1981); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-29-1 (1982); South Dakota,
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 51-20A-2 (1979); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-601,
45-3-104, 301, 308 (1980); Texas, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 391 (Vernon); Utah,
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7-16-1 to 18 (1982); Virginia, VA. CODE §§ 6.1-39.1, -39.2 (1983);
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 30.43.010 - .050 (1983).
47. Alabama, ALA. CODE § 5-2A-7 (Supp. 1981); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 6:237B (West 1983); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 384-B:7 (Supp. 1983).
48. Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) survey, noted in Telephone Interview with Glenn L Allen Jr., Director of Automation and Public Interest, CSBS
(January 22, 1984).
49. Those states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois,
Iowa, Minnesota (at retail locations), Montana, Nebraska, Oregon, South Dakota,
Texas (cash and purchases at retail locations), Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. See supra notes 46 and 47.
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or place EFT facilities in that state;5 0 and (c) banks chartered by
that state to provide EFT services out of state. 51 Eleven states include consumer protection provisions in their EFT statutes. 52 In
June 1983, Texas adopted a law allowing Texas financial institutions
to debit customers' accounts from the use of debit cards at point-of53
sale terminals.
D.

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF FUNDS

Only a fragmentary body of common law governs transfers of
funds by wire or electronic means. 54 Generally, wire or electronic
50. Those states are Alabama, Florida, Illinois (point of sale), Maryland, Minnesota (at retail locations), Montana, Oregon, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. See supra notes 46-47.
51. Those states are Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois (point of sale), Minnesota (at retail locations), Oregon, Utah, Virginia and Washington. See supra, notes 46 and 47.
Only Iowa specifically prohibits this activity.
52. Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-6.5-109 (Supp. 1983); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 658.65 (10), (12) (West Supp. 1984); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 527.6-10 (West Supp.
1983-84); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9.1111(d) (1982); Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 488.1-488.31 (Callaghan 1983); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.69 (West Supp.
1984); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 32-6-104 to 106, 32-6-301 to 303 (1983); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-16-12 to 16 (Supp. 1983); Texas, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.,
ch. 391 (Vernon); Virginia, Virginia Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) Regulations,
April 26, 1977; Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.41 (1982).
53. Stearns, Point of Sale Bill to Governor, Am. Banker, June 1, 1983, at 2, col. 1.
54. There are four interbank electronic "wire" transfer networks:
(1) FEDWIRE: a telecommunication and settlement network linking Federal
Reserve offices and banks nationwide since 1918, FEDWIRE facilitates the transfer of
money throughout the United States by debits and credits to financial institutions'
accounts at Federal Reserve banks. A number of banks have established direct online terminals for moving and monitoring the transfer of funds ("federal funds") from
the sender financial institution's reserve account to the receiving institution's reserve
account. FEDWIRE is also used to execute the net settlements for paperless entries
processed through ACHs. See S.E.C. v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
(2) BANKWIRE(II) or CASHWIRE: BANKWIRE is a private communications
system serving about 200 banks in the United States and Canada through a membership cooperative payment and administrative communications corporation. Its payment and communication services meet most of the needs of both bank management
and customers. BANKWIRE cannot make interbank settlements directly, but such
settlements are now effected on a net basis through debits and credits to the reserve
accounts of the respective institutions at the Federal Reserve banks. The principal
advantage of BANKWIRE is its ability to transmit free-form interbank communications and repayment instructions, confirm securities transactions, and transfer funds
directly among members. NCEFT, Appendix C, supra note 8, at 338-39. BANKWIRE
may also be used in connection with nationwide ACH operations.
(3) CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payments System): CHIPS was one of
the first electronic funds transfer systems within the commercial banking system,
handling interbank transfers of funds for international customers of the New York
Clearing House member banks since April 1970. CHIPS is owned and operated by
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transfers are governed by private contractual arrangements between
the participants, and the application of analogous provisions of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 4 (Bank Deposits and Collections).
If the transfer (wire or electronic) is processed through FEDWIRE,
it is subject to the provisions of Federal Reserve Regulation J (Wire
Transfer of Funds).55
1. Domestic Transfers
Domestic transfers of funds give rise to problems such as forged
instructions and funds credited to improper accounts. In Securities
Fund Services, Inc. v. American National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago,5 6 the relationship between the initiator of a wire transfer and
the collecting bank along with the corresponding duty of care was at
issue. In that case, the initiator brought suit against the collecting
bank to recover funds paid pursuant to forged instructions and
credited to the wrong account. The Court held that under the Uniform Commercial Code, the initiator was a "customer" of the collecting bank, establishing an agency relationship. The bank breached
its duty of care by not acting in good faith and failing to use ordi57
nary care.
2.

InternationalTransfers

One of the banking problems in international funds transfers is
the lack of uniform standards for checking the authenticity of
the New York Clearing House Association. A member bank desiring to make payment on behalf of a customer involving an international transaction simply provides
the CHIPS computer with relevant payment instructions, including assigned account
identification numbers. The computer stores the information until an authorized person at the sending bank approves the release of the message to the receiving institution. The CHIPS computer also performs the basic accounting functions required for
clearing and settlement.
(4) The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
(SWIFT): This originated in Europe in 1970. Presently it is a nonprofit corporation
established in Belgium and owned by 300 banks in the United States, Canada and 13
western European countries. It is an international interbank communications network, enabling its members to transmit international payments, statements and other
messages associated with international banking. SWIFT is a message switching and
payment transfer system and not a settlement of accounts system; debit and credit
entries are made only on the books of the respective institutions, whereas in settlement systems like FEDWIRE and BANKWIRE the squaring or settling of accounts
by the institutions is done through the reserve accounts of the participating institutions at the Federal Reserve banks.
55. 12 C.F.R. §§ 210.25-.38 (1982).
56. Securities Funds Servs. Inc. v. American Nat'l. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 542 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
57. Id. at 237.
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money-moving instructions by bankers and brokers in the international money market. 58 In a New York case, D had an account with
M Trust Co., and authorized M (by Telex messages sent the day
before the transfer was to be made) to make payments out of D's
account.5 9 On June 25, D sent a Telex message to M authorizing
transfer of $12.5 million to C Bank on June 26, for the account of
Herstat. Herstat was closed by German authorities on June 26, but
the transfer was effected before the time of notice of the closing.
The court held that the U.C.C. is not applicable to wire transfers, as
they are not "items. ' 60 But, "based on the nature of the CHIP system and the fact that its member banks viewed such transactions as
irrevocable (as evidenced by the short-term change instituted after
the Herstat failure), the CHIP's transfer was irrevocable when
made."6 1 The court applied the concept of finality of payment of
checks once accepted to the wire transfer.
In an Illinois case, plaintiff H telephoned its Illinois bank to
make a wire transfer of funds ($27,000) from its account to Swiss
Bank for the account of Shipowner at Banque de Paris, to cover a
charter hire period that was due April 27.62 The telex reached the
London office of the Illinois bank on the night of April 25. Its Telex
operator, failing to reach Swiss Bank through Swiss's general Telex
number for transmittal of transfer of funds messages, diverted the
telex message to Swiss Bank's Foreign Exchange Department.
Swiss Bank had no procedures in its Foreign Exchange Department
for transferring or recording telex messages destined for other departments, and failed to record the message in any manner. As no
funds reached the Shipowner by April 27, he cancelled the charter
resulting in a loss to H of $2 million. The court held U.C.C. Article 4
inapplicable to the wire fund transfer situation and concluded that
Swiss Bank as a corresponding bank was not liable. The court
stated that Swiss Bank did not know when payment was due, what
the charter terms were, or that these terms were extremely
favorable to H, so that neither Swiss Bank nor Continental was liable. The Court said, "Electronic funds transfers are not so unusual
58. Trigaux, Wholesale EFT. A False Sense of Security?, Am. Banker, Sept. 22,
1983, at 9, col. 3.
59. Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir.
1979).
60. "Item means any instrument for the payment of money even though it is not
negotiable, but does not include money." U.C.C. § 4-104(1)(g) (1977).
61. Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir.
1979).
62. Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1017 (1982).
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as to automatically place a bank on63notice of extraordinary consequences if such transfer goes awry."
The banking industry now has a set of rules covering errors in
international funds transfers, adopted by the Council on International Banking and the New York Clearing House on January 1,
1983; by the Mid-American and Western Councils on International
Banking on February 1, 1983; and accepted by the California
Clearinghouse in March 1983. Other large clearinghouses are favorably disposed. The new rules cover three types of errors:
(a) erroneous or duplicate payments; (b) late payments; and
(c) payments to a correct bank but incorrect beneficiary.64
II.
A.

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

COMPUTER-RELATED CRIME AND ABUSE

The United States Chamber of Commerce estimates losses from
business, economic and white-collar crime may cost more than $40
billion a year. Many crimes may be committed through the use of
computers. 65 The use of computers to conduct financial transactions, especially electronic fund transfers, is expected to be a :ucrative area for theft. Computer technology has almost completely
displaced manual and mechanical transfers of funds between individuals, financial institutions, businesses and government. The
technology now available makes EFT cost-effective but vulnerable to
criminal exploitation.
Computer crime is very difficult to detect. Often there is little or
no evidence that a crime has occurred. Indeed, in the vast majority
of cases, detection has been a matter of sheer accident rather than
the result of an ongoing security or auditing effort. Most computerrelated crime may be unreported or undiscoverable.6 6 The problem
is as limitless as the technology that spawned it.
Computer crimes involve the use of data and information
processing systems in a manner which causes loss, damage or injury. Main categories of computer-related crimes include:
(1) Introduction of fraudulent records or data into a computer
system;
(2) unauthorized use of computer-related facilities;
63. Id. at 956.
64. Preston, Banks Now Have Rules on International Transfer Errors, Am.
Banker, April 6, 1983, at 14, cols. 2-4.
65. For an excellent comprehensive review of computer crime, see 2 COMPUrER
L.J., No. 2, Spring 1980.
66. Sokolik, Computer Crime-The Need For Deterrent Legislation, 2 COMPUTER
LJ. 353, 357-60 (1980).
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(3) alteration or destruction of information or files stored in the
computer;
(4) theft of money, financial instruments, property or services
through a computer system;
(5) theft of valuable computer data or information; 67and
(6) sabotage or vandalism of the computer system.
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported that the
most common weaknesses exploited by computer criminals in the
federal agency cases studied were separation of duties and physical
control over facilities and supplies. 68 Both of these weaknesses can
be overcome. Effective solutions will require computer crime experts to inform the user community of the vulnerability of computers and to assist users in implementing safeguard techniques for
detection, investigation, prosecution and prevention of computer
crime.

69

For the purposes of this article, computer-related crime includes: (1) violent crimes against computer systems; (2) robbery or
assault of users; (3) insider crime; (4) unauthorized use; and
(5) theft of valuable computer-stored assets. Computer fraud includes credit card related fraud, electronic thefts and "in-house"
embezzlements.
1.

Violent Crimes Against the Computer System

This category includes physical attacks on the system such as
bombing, burglary, vandalism and sabotage. ATM burglaries are a
new problem confronting bank security experts. Bombings of ATMs
also have assumed a new dimension. Recent bombings have been
reported in two cities. No injuries occurred, and not all explosions
penetrated the machines, but property damage was heavy (the explosions also destroyed the money). Terrorists have blasted ATMs
70
to finance radical causes.
2.

Robbery or Assault of Users

ATM users have been robbed after withdrawing cash from the
67. 125 CONG. REC. 31,167 (1979); A. BEQUAI, COMPUTER CRIME 13-14 (1978).
68. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COMPUTER RELATED CRIMES IN FEDERAL PROGRAMS 9-

11 (1976).
69. Volgyes, The Investigation, Prosecution, and Prevention of Computer Crime:
A State-of-the Art Review, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 385, 389 (1980).
70. Sudo, Community Leader Allegedly Sticks up ATMs With Glue, Am. Banker,
Sept. 14, 1984, at 7, col. 2. Matthews, ATM Bomb Blast Damages NY Bank, Am.
Banker, Sept. 20, 1983, at 2, col. 1; Matthews, Teller Machine Bombed in Texas, Carolina, Am. Banker, July 14, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
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machines. Users have also been kidnapped and forced to withdraw
cash from the ATM. Victims of such robberies may bring civil suits
lack of
against the institutions alleging lack of adequate security and
71
notice to the public of special risks involved in ATM use.
The Bank Protection Act of 196872 sets standards for surveillance systems, burglar alarms and vault strength. These can also be
applied to ATMs.
3.

Insider Crime

Theft by an employee with access to the computer system is insider crime. To combat this problem, institutions have reviewed
their internal controls, placing emphasis on enforcement of system
controls and safeguards. Sufficient controls are necessary to insure
accuracy and reliability in the data produced by the computer. Restrictions should be put on access to and ability to alter computer
records and data. Audit trails should document transactions and
identities of those making particular entries. 73 Electronic record
keeping systems are only as trustworthy as the people who use
them.
4.

Unauthorized Use

Unauthorized entry into a computer to make free use of its data
processing capabilities is another common abuse of computers. In
one case, a credit fraud ring employed a data clerk to alter credit
records of several hundred persons with poor credit, enabling them
74
to obtain credit at financial institutions and retail businesses.
75
In United States v. Sampson, the defendant admitted unauthorized use of advanced PDP computers for an average of 6 hours
per week for a period of 32 weeks. He also admitted taking for personal use computer printouts with a commercial value of $1,924. The
court held that computer time is a thing of value 76 and consumption
of computer time and use of its capacity is inseparable from the
71. Court Drops Chase Motion in ATM Security Suit by Assaulted Customer, Am.
Banker, May 15, 1984, at 33, col. 3.
72. Bank Protection Act of 1968, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1881-84 (1982); 12 C.F.R. §§ 21, 216,
326, 563a (1984).
73. See generally, Nycum & Lowell, Common Law and Statutory Liabilityfor Inaccurate Computer-Based Data, 30 EMORY LJ. 445, 465-80 (1981).
74. Whiteside, Annals of Crime, Dead Souls in the Computer, II, THE NEW
YORKER, Aug. 29, 1977, at 34-35.
75. United States v. Sampson, 6 Computer L Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 879 (N.D.
Cal. 1978).
76. Id. at 880.
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physical identity of the computer equipment. 77
5.

Theft of Valuable Computer-Stored Assets

Information is the target of computer crime. Computer crimes
may include alteration, seizure or destruction of a computer program or its data files. For example, a thief may use a home computer to tap into a financial institution's computer system, causing a
series of unauthorized transfers to a bogus account for subsequent
78
transfer overseas.
Creation of new computer-stored financial assets (e.g., certificateless "book-entry" securities, data-only bank account balances, computer money) creates the potential for misuse and theft of those
assets and related information. Those who develop and work with
these computer assets can often alter or delete them or create totally new assets. Such financial assets are sent through wires, microwave carriers and satellite transmitters in the form of electronic
79
or electromagnetic waves and magnetism.
B.

COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE

The increasing dependence on EFT/PEP systems by financial
institutions and their customers, while increasing efficiency, increases the threat of computer fraud and abuse. This threat exists
not only in the less established (but expanding) retail and wholesale EFT/PEP systems (e.g., ATMs and POS terminals where relatively small transactions occur), but also in wholesale EFT networks
(e.g., FEDWIRE, CHIPS) which involve much larger transactions.
EFT/PEP systems are subject to theft, error and malfunction. Unlike more traditional payment mechanisms, however, these systems
are not yet governed by laws that assign rights and responsibilities
between depository institutions and their customers. One exception
is EFTA, which is limited to consumer relationships with depository
institutions. EFTA limits the consumer's liability on unauthorized
transfers.
1.

Credit CardFraud

Security and fraud issues pervade electronic transfer and payment systems. The credit card and debit card are highly vulnerable
to fraud. The electronic debit card 80 is more vulnerable because it
77. Id.
78. Koehn, Information is Targetfor Today's Criminal Am. Banker, March 15,
1982, at 10, col. 1.
79. D. PARKER, CRIME BY COMPUTER 4 (1976).
80. See supra note 11.
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can directly access cash and demand deposit account balances, merchandise and services. Bank credit card fraud losses cost the banking industry an estimated $150 million per year.8 1 Collusion by
merchants who intentionally accept unauthorized, fraudulent or fictitious credit card charges, charges from false sales, or charges from
credit card thieves facilitate credit card fraud. Increasing fraud
losses, which have prompted new federal legislation and a host of
computer system changes, result largely from counterfeiting techniques used by syndicated criminal enterprises working with corrupt merchants.
Until October, 1984, there were no 82 federal statutes specifically
addressing credit or debit card fraud. However, Congress has now
passed a bill which would make criminal certain credit card fraud,
83
including possession of counterfeit or stolen credit cards.
2.

Electronic Thefts

Electronic thefts are becoming commonplace and result in great
losses. For example, in New York, thieves posing as bank service
employees attempting to repair broken ATMs made withdrawals
from the accounts of 485 customers at Citibank. The New York Attorney General sued Citibank, alleging that its failure to treat the
"lost" withdrawals as "unauthorized" electronic transfers violated
the customers' rights under EFTA. The cases were settled without
84
admission of any wrongdoing by Citibank.
3.

In-House Embezzlement

The criminal who constitutes the greatest threat to computer security may be trusted employees authorized to operate in-house
computers. Possible safeguards against this threat are automatic
dial-back devices, frequent change of user-passwords, biometrical
85
measurements, and the use of a network of informants.
Embezzlement by in-house computer users often constitutes
fraud. For example, where a corporate employee causes a computer
to prepare checks to existing payees based on nonexisting accounts
81. Weinskin, Secret Service to Help Fight Card Fraud,Am. Banker, Aug. 1, 1984,
at 1, col. 4. Credit Card Fraud Topic For House Unit Am. Banker, May 23, 1983, at 63,
col. 2; Tyson, supra note 5.
82. Garsson, New Law Cracks Down on Card Fraud With Stiff Penaltyfor Counterfeiting,Am. Banker, Oct. 16, 1984, at 1, col 2.
83. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-473, § 1601, 98 Stat.
1837, 2183-84 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1029).
84. Winter, Banking By Blip, 69 A.B.A.J. 263, 264 (1983).
85. Fitzgerald, Insiders Threat to Computer Security, Am. Banker, Feb. 3, 1984, at
1, col. 2.
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payable (e.g., analogous to a "fictitious payee" situation under Uniform Commercial Code, Article 3-Commercial Paper), a genuine
and the
writing containing false statements of fact was created,
86
committed.
been
had
fraud
or
pretenses
false
of
crime
In most fraud cases there is usually a breakdown of security
controls which permits the unauthorized or illegal use. The Equity
Funding case involved the manipulation of computer files and creation of data to conceal fraudulent insurance policies. 87 Much of this
was performed by personnel outside the EDP department, who were
88
allowed access to computer equipment and ffies.
One of the most notorious cases of computer fraud was the $10.2
million swindle of the Security Pacific National Bank, in Los Angeles, California. This crime did not directly involve the use of a computer. Rifkin, a familiar figure at the bank, obtained the
authentication code for wire and electronic transfer of funds on a
particular day. Posing as a branch manager, he ordered $10.2 million
transferred to a Swiss bank account. 89 In another case, four men
were indicted by a federal grand jury for participating in a successful embezzlement scheme that cost Citibank N.A. $3 million. An employee of the bank aided the thieves by sending a telex
communication transferring $3 million to a numbered account in Curacao, Netherland Antilles. 90 These cases demonstrate the growth
of in-house computer crime, the high costs of this crime, and the
need for greater control over access to and use of computers.
C.

COMPUTER ERROR OR FAILURE

The legal system must come to grips with new problems and potential legal repercussions created by computer error and failure.
"Fraudulent intent is not the only threat to financial operations security, nor even the greatest. In terms of actual loss, inadvertent errors provide the most exposure; without adequate security
precautions, a bank is literally at the mercy of the collective attitude
of its data entry operators." 9 ' Increased reliance on computers by
financial institutions has created other legal problems. Accounting

86. United States v. Jones, 553 F.2d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 1977).
87. Whiteside, Annals of Crime, Dead Souls in the Computer,I, THE NEW YORKER,
Aug. 22, 1979, at 35, 38-42.
88. Id.
89. For a more complete discussion of this case, see Becker, Ri/kin, A Documentary History,2 COMPUTER L.J. 471 (1980).
90. N.Y. Man Arrested in $3 Million Theft, San Diego Tribune, Apr. 1, 1980, at C8,
col. 6.
91. Carlin, Evaluating Bank Accounting Software: The Managing Executive's
Viewpoint MAG. OF BANK AD., Oct. 1983, at 33-34.
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functions are often performed automatically by computers with little
or no human oversight. Consequently, errors in the computer's operational systems and programs may go undetected, and can be
compounded with each accounting cycle. These errors can place significant burdens on unsuspecting debtors and account holders.
A computer system consists of three components: hardware,
software, and humans. Each component suffers from its own particular weaknesses and the failure of any component may result in serious harm. For example, in a case concerning a delay in
dishonoring checks which was caused by computer failure, the court
held that the delay was excused under U.C.C. Article 4 (Bank Deposits and Collections) as beyond the control of the payor bank,
92
which had used reasonable diligence under the circumstances.
Yet another court held a bank liable for failure to meet the deadline
for payment or dishonor of a check, even though the delay was
caused by a computer malfunction and a subsequent brief power
failure in the area which shut down the computer, requiring lengthy
restart procedures. The court found that the payor bank had failed
to act with requisite diligence by not having alternative processing
systems given prior computer failures. The bank was also remiss for
relying on a computer requiring several hours to restart in the event
of electrical failure. 93 It is evident from these examples that the legislature and courts must develop a policy to deal with this problem.
Computer malfunctions, including errors in data or information
input and malfunctions caused by faulty software, may result in
spectacular accidents such as airplane crashes or nuclear power
plant failures, as well as such mundane problems as the loss of accounting records, double billing, and deposits or withdrawals entered into the wrong account. The legal characterization of
computer services may influence how courts apply traditional common law negligence theories or concepts to computer malfunctions
and error.
There is a common law duty imposed on those who use or supply computer services to exercise reasonable care to ascertain the
accuracy of the information furnished by or to a computer system,
before transmitting or relying on such data. Traditional negligence
theory requires a plaintiff to prove by a preponderence of evidence
that the defendant breached a duty and the breach proximately
caused harm to the plaintiff. The nature of the computer system,
however, makes proof of negligence, particularly proximate cause,
92. Port City State Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 486 F.2d 196 (10th Cir. 1973).
93. Congress Factors Corp. v. Extrebank, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1559

(1982).
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difficult. Because computers malfunction for many reasons, it is
often difficult to determine the cause of a particular error. Consequently, a victim of computer error may be unable to prove the malfunction resulted from a breach of duty, or that an act or omission
by the tortfeasor proximately caused the damage.
When evidence of specific negligence is lacking, courts sometimes allow the plaintiff to prove negligence by inference (e.g., by
applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur). Even this approach,
however, would be difficult to apply in cases of computer malfunction. Since most of a computer system's operations are beyond direct supervision, discovering which element was the actual cause of
a particular error or malfunction may be extremely difficult. Furthermore, because each computer system is unique in some respect,
a characteristic of failure in one system may not be characteristic of
the same failure in another system. 94 In the future, the concept of
due care used to determine whether proper controls were used may
include the use of a "state of the art" standard in evaluating the
duty of care required for a particular situation.
D.

INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY

Computers create the potential to accumulate vast amounts of
data and information that can be readily and easily stored and retrieved. Unfortunately, this also creates the potential for manipulation of information. The electronic financial transactions area is not
immune to this manipulation. This raises questions regarding the
extent to which individuals have a right to privacy. The issue of privacy of information collected in centralized computers was raised in
Whalen v. Roe,9 5 but the U.S. Supreme Court skirted the issue.
Congress has attempted to provide statutory safeguards for individuals' disclosural right of privacy, where the U.S. Constitution and
common law fail to provide adequate protection. EFTA provides no
specific privacy protection. However, minimal protection was included in the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (RFPA), 96 and
the Privacy Act of 1974 (a counterpart to the Freedom of Information Act).9 7 RFPA provides privacy protection to an individual's financial records, but applies only to federal government agencies. It
does not apply to local or state agencies, nor to private entities such
94. Hanson, Easing Plaintiffs Burden of Proving Negligence for Computer Malfunction, 69 IowA L.J. 241, 243 (1983).
95. 429 U.S. 589 (1977),
96. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1982).
97. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
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as credit reporting agencies. Additionally, RFPA merely provides
procedural, not substantive rights.
EFT facilities deployment and consumer protection statutes of
several states include privacy protection provisions, which apply
specifically to EFT transactions. 98 California has enacted privacy
legislation which extends protection well beyond federal law.99 California courts have held that the state's constitutional amendment
protects privacy in matters concerning bank records, credit card
charges, college transcripts, medical records and personnel
records. 100 Twenty-two states have EFT or related computer statutes regulating information gathering practices or computerized
data processing, although such major states as New York and Texas
are not yet protected.'O1 Most of the state laws, however, only address situations in which a state government agency is involved.
III.

COMPUTER SECURITY AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES

Although development of a penetration-proof computer is highly
unlikely, much more can be done to discover, deter and punish
those who commit computer crimes and fraud. Computer technology has outpaced computer security. Many recent studies have
shown that the majority of computer systems, even when provided
with security, are still open to attack and can be penetrated by sophisticated criminals.

A.

EFT SEcURrrY

The potential vulnerabilities of EFT systems, and security
measures to counteract these problems, were not considered when
EFT systems were designed, even though EFT's are well publicized
sources of exposure of financial institutions' computer systems. The
software vendor, who is equipped to deal with this problem, should
assume responsibility for this problem. Application software performs the daily accounting data processing, so its programs are
likely targets of subversion by computer professionals who want to
misappropriate funds. Package software systems for financial institutions are inadequate in their provisions for data security and
access.
98. See Greguras & Wright, The Preemption Dilemma Under the New EFT Act, 12
U.C.C. L.J. 3 (1979).
99. Cal. Const. art. 1, § 1; CAL. CrV. CODE §§ 1798-1798.76 (Deering Supp. 1984).
100. Note, Computers in the Private Sector. Informational Right of Privacy for
Consumers, 22 WASHBuRN LJ. 469, 477-81 (1983).
101. Tyson, supra note 5.
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PROTECTIVE MEASURES

Institutions should develop tight physical security for the computer facilities. An elaborate internal audit trail should be built into
the system in which every significant communication between the
user and the computer system is recorded. Where confidentiality is
particularly important, cryptography or encryption (scrambling of
information) should be employed. Also pressing is the need for
more secure user identification techniques.
The possibility that customer account records can be destroyed
as a result of physical damage or fraudulent misuse of a computer
system is a serious EFT system security problem. An EFT computer system must contain physical safeguards, such as locks and
fire and water protection, to prevent damage to the equipment and
to its associated information. Communication lines between terminals and the main computer must also be secure from tapping,
message insertions, modification of message content, and illegal
surveillance.
Since EFT systems are vulnerable to fraudulent programming,
comprehensive audit trails or records must be incorporated into the
system in order to detect extraordinary use patterns. Further, to
minimize the need for a wholesale reprogramming of the system
when key employees leave the company, employee duties within the
computer center must be under dual control such that no one per10 2
son controls an entire step in the EFT system.
Additionally, computer cryptography and communications
scrambling is necessary to protect data and information being communicated to and stored in computer systems. In encryption, a complex algorithm or computer routine is used to scramble messages,
which are unscrambled at the receiving end. Message authentication, similar to data encryption, uses the same algorithm to calculate
an authentication code instead of scrambling the message. Message
encryption is an option for making computer data storage and transmission more secure, especially as electronic in-home financial service evolves, increasing the need to provide adequate security
measures for electronic financial transactions and customer data bases of financial institutions. Encryption of transmitted data ensures
security of communication and prevents a computer embezzler from
deciphering account information.
User identification methods currently in use (e.g., user's signature, driver's licenses, personal identification numbers) have failed
102. Jinnett, EFTS:. Consumer Protection Under the U.C.C., 10 J. L REFORM 497,
512-14 (1977).
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to provide much security and protection against unauthorized access to funds in an individuals' accounts. The key element lacking
for a secure, effective EFT system is an identification device and terminal receptor oriented toward identifying the person seeking access. On-line terminals and computer-oriented identification
verification procedures may be feasible and more secure alternatives to personal identification numbers.
Another alternative may be the use of electronic signatures
which can be given unique characteristics, making them more easily
identifiable and reliable than human handwriting or other forms of
identification. Another potential device is one that will oblige the
user of a terminal, before accessing the computer, to press a physical impression on a special pad or plate on the terminal or attached
to it, allowing instantaneous comparison of the whorls and loops or
other characteristics against a digital image previously stored in the
computer data base. Indeed,
"the U.S. Army plans to test a new access method for ATMs, using a
hand-print rather than a personal identification number. The characteristics of the soldier's hand is read by special equipment and
recorded on a plastic card. The user inserts the card into the ATM
and places his or her hand on an attached hand-reading device
linked to the ATM. If the data captured by the hand-reader
matches the data10 recorded
on the card, the user can proceed with
3
the transaction."
C.

CRIME INSURANCE FOR THE ELECTRONIC AGE

Rapidly expanding computer technology is likely to result in a
proliferation of on-line systems, with terminals becoming almost as
common as telephones. The massive dollar amounts involved, particularly in electronic transfer of funds, exposes financial institutions to possible losses of catastrophic proportions. New forms of
insurance coverage will be needed to insure against the potential liability that might result from fraud, product liability, system errors
and malfunctions.1 4
The original response of insurance companies was to offer separate policies covering specific risks. Later these separate policies
were combined into one, a "bankers blanket bond," each of the former separate policies becoming an individual item of coverage in
the combined policy. One of the key terms of coverage is that manifest intent to perform a criminal act must be found before the in103. Lieberman, Army's New ATMs Offer Hands-On Training,Am. Banker, Aug. 8,
1984, at 3, col. 1.
104. Brouillette, supra note 4.
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surer becomes liable. As a result, this coverage may be inadequate
for exposures of electronic financial service products. Employee defalcations including those that are computer related may be covered
by a standard blanket-bond provision, but non-employee fraud (e.g.,
fraud resulting from activities of independent consultants, engineers, programmers and former employees) probably would not be
covered. Coverage for non-employee computer crime exposure risk
and for electronic data processors or service bureaus, is being of10 5
fered by several major insurance underwriters.
Discount brokerage, another service product being offered by financial institutions, can add potential errors and omissions exposure in stock clearing, stock transfer and order execution. Even
though discount brokerage services may be farmed out to a nonowned discount broker, the institution cannot transfer all responsibility for these services to the broker, and may well be included in a
suit for negligence. Such risk exposure should be specifically pro10 6
vided for in insurance coverage.
Finally, insurance policy terms and provisions must be flexible
10 7
enough to cover risks inherent in EFT/PEP systems.
IV.

ADMISSIBILITY OF COMPUTER-BASED EVIDENCE

The introduction of computer-based evidence poses a problem,
whether it involves a computer crime case, or any case requiring
computer information as evidence. Judges and juries, who know little about computers, may feel ill-equipped to question the credibility of computer evidence, particularly when its credibility is
supported by the testimony of computer experts. Courts have experienced difficulty in dealing with admissibility of computer generated evidence. In one case, a circuit court held that the actions of
the defendant (who had procured the issuance of a false check by a
computer) did not constitute forgery, but the issuance of a genuine
instrument containing a false statement of fact as to the true
10 8
payee.
Litigation involving the use of computers has presented the
courts with an increased number of requests to admit into evidence
computer records in the form of printouts. United States v. Russo'0 9
105. Huss, Crime Insurancefor the ElectronicAge, MAG. OF BANK AD. May 1983, at
58-60.
106. Oestreich, Rapid Change in the Banking Industry Increases the Chance of
Loss, MAG. OF BANK AD., Jan. 1984, at 30-34.

107.
1983, at
108.
109.

Matthews, Bank Insurance Now Covers Electronic Risks, Am. Banker, Feb. 22,
1, col. 4.
United States v. Jones, 553 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1977).
480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973).
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was the first case to address the conceptual problems presented by
computer printouts. The court required that a firm foundation be
laid describing the computer system and its operating environment
before the computer printout could be introduced into evidence.
There are four possible bases for admission of a computer
printout into evidence: (1) the original record or common law best
evidence rule; (2) the business records exception to the hearsay
rule; (3) statutory provisions; and (4) specific rules of evidence. 1 10
Statements made out of court by an unavailable declarant which are
offered for the truth of the matter asserted are inadmissable as
hearsay under common law and the Federal Rules of Evidence."'
Computer printouts may be considered hearsay. The business
records exception to the hearsay rule has been relied on to admit
computer-generated documentation into evidence. The "best evidence" rule" 2 provides that where the contents of a writing are in
issue, an original copy must be produced unless justification for its
absence is presented. Two exceptions" 3 to the best evidence rule
have been held to include computer printouts: official records and
voluminous writings. Courts have treated records stored in computers as if they had been traditionally prepared for purposes of the
best evidence rule," 4 and oral testimony pertaining to the contents
11 5
of computer data files have been excluded as violative of the rule.
The admissability of computer generated documentation impacts on
the outcome of any civil or criminal trial.
V.

LAW ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS

Current problems of crime and abuse connected with computers
will be magnified by the growth of EFTS. These problems necessitate an investigatory and prosecutorial apparatus that can meet the
expanding need to deal with computer criminals.
A.

INVESTIGATION

The investigatory apparatus requires training and development
of programs to detect and combat computer crime. Present
prosecutorial machinery is also in need of training in this area. Few
110. For a more extensive discussion, see Vergari, Evidential Value and Acceptability of Computer Digital-Image Printouts,9 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 346, 350

(1983).
111. Gammer, Computer Crime, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 370, 384-86 (1980).
112. FED. R. EVID. §§ 1001-1004.

113. FED. R. EVID. §§ 1005-1006.
114. King v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393, 397-98 (Miss. 1969).
115. State v. McGee, 329 A.2d 581, 584-85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 1974).
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prosecutors, local or federal, have had any experience with computer crime. For example, it is highly unlikely that law enforcement
personnel would recognize as unlawful the activity of an interloper
who uses a remote telephone-connected terminal to give privileged
commands to a computer system to wipe out the table of contents of
the entire disk-storage data base for more than 5000 users of the system and the operating system itself. Law enforcement officials will
therefore be unable to effectively combat this crime. Frequently,
theft by computer is difficult to discover, and even after discovery it
may be difficult to trace the crime to a particular individual. Once
the crime is discovered, local law enforcement officials are often reluctant to file criminal charges against the computer criminal, finding it difficult to structure a criminal complaint for these crimes.

B.

PROSECUTION

Computer crime is one of the most sophisticated types of whitecollar crime. This often has the effect of discouraging a prosecutor,
who frequently has absolutely no knowledge of computers, from
pursuing a case. Law enforcement agencies have neither the technical expertise nor the legal framework to detect, prosecute, or discourage computer crime. Prosecutors are forced to create a theory
of prosecution which fits the computer crime within the framework
of more traditional crimes such as theft or embezzlement. Crafting
such a theory can be awkward and results far from perfect. Penalties are often too small.1 1 6 The current apparatus cannot possibly
meet the challenge presented by different forms of computer crime.
A decade ago, attorneys did not need to educate themselves in
the intricacies of technology to serve their clients or prosecute
crimes. But in this highly technological society, many more clients
are involved in complex technical matters which raise intricate legal
questions that can be answered correctly only if attorneys understand the facts involved-facts which concern the nature of the particular technology. As a result, a significant number of prosecutors
are being educated and trained in new technology enabling them to
deal effectively with computer-related crimes.
C.

LEGISLATION

The vulnerability of computer users, uncertainty regarding the
applicability of existing common and statutory law to computer
crime, and the complexity of the possible criminal acts all have led
116. Ognibene, Guarding Against High-Tech Espionage, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1983,
at A23, col. 3.
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to pressures at both federal and state levels to enact computer
crime legislation.
Federal authorities currently attempt to place computer crimes
within the framework of the federal crimes of tax evasion and mail
or wire fraud. They also rely on embezzlement and theft statutes
covering federal agencies and instrumentalities, banking statutes,
and laws dealing with false entries in records, reports and other
transactions of financial institutions and federal credit institutions. 117 In addition, authorities can now rely on new criminal sanctions in the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1984.118
Thirty-eight states have enacted statutes making criminal various intentional actions taken with respect to telecommunications or
computing. Twenty-two states have new "computer crime" laws." 19
Most of these new enactments make criminal fraudulent activity
perpetrated by use of a computer system. At least one of these statutes (Florid-a) creates a new crime for acts against intellectual property.1 20 Most of these statutes criminalize tampering with
telecommunication services, or fraud in the use of free telecommunication services.
The purpose of these state computer crime laws has been to
make prosecution of computer crime easier by creating laws dealing
specifically with this problem. In some cases, they are also designed
to deal with persons who are detected adding, removing or erasing
data from a computer without authorization yet without a fraudu2
lent scheme or an intent to steal.' '
VI.

ELECTRONIC FINANCIAL SERVICES POWER

Depository financial institutions (e.g., commercial banks, savings and loan associations, savings banks and credit unions) are
strictly regulated and may exercise only those powers authorized by
applicable state or federal statute. State-chartered financial institutions are subject to the laws of their "home" state regarding their
powers and that state's definition of branch banking. The federal
EFTA does not authorize financial institutions to provide electronic
117. Sokolik, supra note 65, at 377.
118. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-473, § 2101, 98 Stat.
1837, 2190-92 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030).
119. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin. San
Diego Tribune, February 20, 1984, at A14.
120. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.04 (West Supp. 1984).
121. Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws, §§ 11-52-1 to -5 (Supp. 1982).
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financial services or to establish EFT terminal facilities. It merely
establishes standards, rights and duties which must be adhered to
122
in providing EFT services to consumers.
EFT systems are not only funds transfer systems, but also
transfer of information systems, data storage systems, and data and
information processing systems. A very important case on banking
powers and their use held that a national bank which offered electronic data processing services to the general public in reliance
123
upon an interpretative ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency,
124
exceeded its powers
by failing to limit use of its "Retail Information Service" to performance of an express power under the National Bank Act. 125 The service offered "must be incidental or useful
126
to business expressly authorized under the National Bank Act."'

A.

BRANCHING POWERS

A financial institution may receive deposits and conduct banking business only at its principal location, unless empowered to do
so at other locations or facilities. Restrictions on geographic locations where a depositary financial institution may do business were
imposed to restrict proliferation of offices and unsound competition
leading to dangerous banking policies and practices.
Establishment of branches by depository financial institutions is
subject to statutes of the chartering state, with federally chartered
financial institutions subject to the branch office provisions of their
chartering federal statute. National banks, although chartered by
the federal government under the National Bank Act, are specifically made subject to the same limitations pertaining to branching
that are applicable to state-chartered banks. 127 Thus, a national
banking association may not establish branches in a state which
128
does not allow branches.
Both federal and state law presently prohibit a bank or a bank
holding company from operating domestic banking offices in more
than one state. Recent legislation and pending bills raise the issue
of the continued viability of geographical restrictions on financial
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1982).
123. 12 C.F.R. § 7.3500 (1984).
124. 12 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
125. National Retailers Corp. of Ariz. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 604 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.
1979).
126. M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1977).
127. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982); First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 131 (1969).
128. Grandview Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, 550 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 821 (1978).
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depository institutions. As a practical matter, financial institutions
do presently conduct a wide variety of business throughout the
country, except the receipt of deposits.

B.

ARE UNAIrENDED ELECTRONIC TERMINAL FACILITIES BRANCHES

Off-premise EFT terminal service units provide deposit and
withdrawal of funds services, transfer of funds between accounts,
and debit accounts for purchases of goods and services at retail establishments. There has been a major legal dispute over the past
few years regarding whether these off-premise EFT terminals are
branches. ATMs, like POS terminals, may be installed away from
the bank premises at shopping centers, retail stores, office buildings,
factories, or other unattended electronic facilities where any customer with an approved access card and proper personal identification can effect financial transactions.
The federal legislative scheme and the Comptroller of the Currency's regulations governing deployment of off-premise ATM/POS
terminals by national banks is complex. Deployment of remote service units (RSUs: ATM operations off-premise or at retail store locations which may be at service counters rather than POS terminals)
by federally chartered financial institutions other than national
banks, such as savings and loan associations and savings banks, is
governed by Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) regulations, 129 and federal credit unions by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). 130 This regulatory scheme has produced
some anomalous results. For example, such federal thrift institutions or credit unions may establish branches anywhere approved
by the FHLBB or NCUA. National banks, however, are governed by
applicable state law restrictions on geographic location and state
law determinations of whether the off-premise unattended EFT terminal facilities are deemed branches. The McFadden Act applies
131
the state law requirements only to national banks.
Thirty-eight states had enacted EFT legislation and/or promulgated EFT regulations as of August 1983.132 Of these, only eight define EFT terminals as branches and subject them to restrictions
which include any geographic or other limitations applicable to
"brick and mortar" branches. 133 Florida provides that neither a re129. 12 C.F.R. § 545.141 (1984).
130. 12 C.F.R. § 721.3 (1984).
131. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982).
132. See supra notes 46-47.
133. Delaware, Maine, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon and Utah.
In addition, under Michigan law, EFT terminals not made available for sharing are
deemed branches. See supra note 46.
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mote financial service unit nor an unattended facility shall be con1
sidered to be a branch. '
In Independent Bankers Association v. Smith,135 the appellate
court held that all off-premise "CBCTs"'136 performing at least one of
the banking functions of receiving deposits, paying checks, withdrawal of cash, or making loans are branches within the terms of the
McFadden Act of 1927.137 As a result, CBCTs must comply with the
branching requirements of both federal and state laws. 138 The result is that if " state permits its state-chartered banks to establish
CBCTs or similar facilities to serve one of these functions, then national banksAn that state may establish CBCTs to perform similar
functions. Ti S result is true even in a state that otherwise prohibits
13 9
branch banking.
North Dakota law provides that state banks may provide "services to its customers involving electronic transfer of funds to the
same extent that other financial institutions chartered and regulated
by an agency of the federal government are permitted to provide
such services within this state."'14 The law further provides that
CBCTs are not considered branches and that sharing of terminals is
mandatory upon request of other banks. 141 When Merchants National Bank of Fargo, North Dakota, was operating two CBCTs pursuant to the authority of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that under North
Dakota law, a state bank can lawfully use a CBCT, because both are
permitted to use remote service units which are similar to CBCTs
and ATMs. Therefore, Merchants National Bank was legally authorized under federal law to maintain the CBCTs as branches. 142
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board is the federal chartering
and supervisory authority for federally-chartered savings and loan
associations and savings banks. In 1974, the FHLBB authorized
First Federal Savings and Loan association to install RSUs in two
134. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.65(8) (West Supp. 1984).
135. 534 F.2d 921, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
136. CBCTs (Customer-Bank Communication Terminals) are manned or unmanned electronic terminals that may permit an existing bank customer to accomplish various financial transactions, including deposits, withdrawals and transfers of
funds between accounts. They are similar in function and purpose to ATMs or POS
terminals.
137. 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(c), (d), (f), 51 (1982).
138. 534 F.2d at 948.
139. Id.
140. N.D. CFNT. CODE § 6-03-02(8) (Supp. 1983).
141. Id.
142. State Bank of Fargo v. Merchants Nat'L Bank and Trust Co., 593 F.2d 341, 346
(8th Cir. 1979).
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Nebraska "Hinky Dinky" supermarkets. Using such an RSU, a depositor/customer of First Federal could deposit or withdraw money
at the Hinky Dinky market. The state sued the owners of the supermarket, 143 claiming that these services constituted unlawful banking
by the supermarket in violation of Nebraska law. 1' The court found
that Hinky Dinky was simply acting as an intermediary, assisting in
the transfer of funds between First Federal and its depositor, and
14 5
those acts did not amount to engaging in the business of banking.
The court noted that the POS computer terminal is analogous to
communication equipment of other kinds in that it simply transmits
information to a central computer. The deposit and withdrawal
transactions are electronically effected and performed by the computer on the records and premises of First Federal. 1'
A new angle has been added to the confused legal status of
ATMs. The Comptroller of the Currency has maintained that an
ATM is not a branch as long as the bank using it does not own or
rent the terminal. 4 7 This position has recently been eroded. In
New York, supermarket owners installed a number of ATMs in their
stores and permitted the ATMs to become a part of the shared ATM
network of a national bank operating in New York state. The court
held that if a national bank uses an ATM, it becomes a branch location regardless of the fact that the ATM is owned by a third party. 14
If upheld on appeal or followed in other states, this decision will
have serious implications for retailers interested in installing their
own ATMs or POS terminals. As third party nondepository institutions install their own electronic terminals with capacity for financial transactions the branch office issue will become increasingly
important for depository financial institutions.
C.

INTERSTATE BANKING IMPLICATIONS

Electronic financial services and transactions defy geographic
boundaries. Because of this, federal regulations which attempt to
deal with these services and transactions are inadequate and should
be repealed. The appropriate first step toward geographic deregula143. Nebraska ex tel. Meyers v. American Community Stores Corp., 193 Neb. 634,
228 N.W.2d 229 (1975).
144. NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-114 (1983).
145. Nebraska ex tel. Meyers v. American Community Stores Corp., 193 Neb. 634,
228 N.W.2d 229 (1975).
146. Id. at 639, 228 N.W.2d at 302.
147. Weinstein, Federal Court Ruling Calls ATMs Banks, Am. Banker, April 13,
1984, at 1, col. 1.
148. Independent Bankers Ass'n of N.Y. State v. Marine Midland Bank, 583 F.

Supp. 1042 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
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tion at the federal level would be to allow interstate operation of
full-service automated transaction machines. A statutory declaration that ATMs are not branches for legal purposes would open the
way for state, regional and nationwide electronic branching. The
banking industry is advocating federal legislation authorizing depository institutions to permit depositors/customers to use electronic
terminals regardless of location. This should allow interstate operation of full-service ATMs.
D.

ANTITRUST ISSUES IN SHARED PROPRIETARY TERMINALS
OR NETWORKS

The objective of American antitrust law is to protect competition at all levels and preserve its benefits, i.e., lower prices, innovation, higher quality and availability of alternatives. Most antitrust
enforcement in the computer industry is based on section 1 (contracts or combinations in restraint of trade), section 2 (monopolization) of the Sherman Act, and section 3 of the Clayton Act
(restraints on dealings with competitors).
Electronic financial services are flexible and competitive. The
purposes of antitrust regulation will be achieved if POS terminals
are capable of connecting with any depository institution, merchants
and depository institutions are unable to exclude other institutions
from participating, and networks of EFT terminals provide an adequate mix of packages at competitive prices. An unregulated system does not appear to have beneficial implications for retail
depository institutions or for the consuming public. In an unregulated world, there would be a significant further concentration of financial and economic power in the hands of giant depository
institutions, major merchant conglomerates or their holding companies. Such concentration could have unfortunate results and implications for the nation's EFr/PEP systems, and for the economy as a
149
whole.
Antitrust implications for EFT and PEP systems will grow as
technology becomes widespread. One important issue is mandatory
sharing. As a general rule, joint activities must be limited to those
150
necessary to accomplish legitimate functions of the joint venture.
Joint activities are tested by their "tendency" towards monopoly, or
their "reasonable likelihood" of substantially lessening competition
in the market.' 5 ' The existing legal and regulatory scheme gov149. For a more extensive discussion, see Pierce, Competitive Implications of EFT,
2 COMPUTER L.J. 133 (1980).
150. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
151. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
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erning sharing of proprietary EFT terminals and systems is compliThere are no federal statutes expressly
cated and unclear.
applicable to the sharing of EFT systems.
Antitrust policies of the Department of Justice came into conflict with state law in the 1970s when many states had enacted laws
requiring institutions deploying EFT machines to provide equal access to customers of any other institution which desired it. 152 The
manner in which these state laws fit into the regulatory scheme of
federal antitrust policy is not clear, and many sharing arrangements
may in fact violate familiar antitrust prohibitions.
Mandatory sharing laws were designed to prevent domination of
EFT business by the largest banks in a state. The Justice Department initially took a dim view of mandatory sharing. The Justice
Department faced the issue in fall, 1981, when Hartford National
Bank sought clearance for its shared EFT program. The Department approved the program but reserved its right to sue if the arrangement was found to diminish competition.
In its most recent elaboration of antitrust policies and law as it
applies to shared EFT networks, the Department of Justice ruled
that a savings association in Texas could belong to both of the
state's major ATM networks. 153 However, the Department's antitrust division added that the ruling applied to that factual situation
only, leaving the law no clearer than it had been prior to this
154
decision.
Another antitrust concern is restrictive cross-market tie-in sales
of other financial services at competitively unfair prices, which
might prevent other EFT service providers from entering the market. Mandatory sharing laws should be interpreted so as to discourage this activity.
The National Commission on Electronic Funds Transfers recommended that federal legislation be enacted to nullify state compulsory sharing laws to the extent that they were inconsistent with
federal antitrust law. The Commission believed that a voluntary
sharing approach would provide users with the widest choice of
services, the lowest prices and the most advanced technology while
imposing the least regulatory burden on the taxpayer and the industry. The Commission pointed to the flexibility of federal antitrust
152. Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington and
Wisconsin. See supra notes 46-47.
153. Garsson, Shared Automated Teller Networks Are Opening Doorsfor Banking
Industry, Am. Banker, Dec. 12, 1983, at 18, col. 3.
154. Id.
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laws as a guarantee of such benefits. 15 5 Federal preemption of state
sharing laws is supported by federal regulators and larger financial
institutions who recognize that remote service units, ATMs, and
POS terminals are essentially regional in utilization and in economic effect.
Are multiple EFT/PEP networks necessary to insure a competitive marketplace? Do networks constitute utilities to which all parties have the right to use on the same terms? No definitive answers
can be given in light of the current state of antitrust regulation in
this area.
CONCLUSION
An EFT/PEP system is both a communications and transfer of
funds system, transfering data and other information relating to the
financial transaction over a series of communication networks.
Under an EFT system the movement will be electronic: electrical
impulses transmitted from terminal to terminal, computer to computer, utilizing thousands of miles of wire, microwave or satellite
carriers.
EFT/PEP transactions often cross state lines, and uniform laws
setting forth the basic rights and duties of the parties are necessary
to codify the desirable rules and regulations. This would create an
opportunity to limit the powers of institutional providers of
EFT/PEP services to act arbitrarily or to make these providers insurers of the processing of EFT/PEP transactions. Variation by
agreement, banking usage and administrative regulation will be
needed to provide flexibility in such a code.
Further, there is an urgent need for improvement in the area of
computer security. Computer information is most vulnerable to alteration or destruction by employees at computer installations; this
should be a primary concern of those who seek to improve computer
security.
Computer crime will take on new forms and pose serious
problems for law enforcement officials. Criminal laws, in many
cases, still fail to address the uniqueness of computer crime, because "physical property" language in statutes cloud over movement of funds by electrical impulses. There is a need for a
computer crime statute which addresses this uniqueness.
Individual privacy may also be open to violation by government,
credit investigators or computer criminals. Both institutions and in155. NCEFT, Appendix C, supra note 8.
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dividuals have rights requiring legal protection from abuse of computer information.
The way in which the law evolves is important to the electronic
financial services industry, and of particular importance to the developing point-of-sale payments sector. If today's EFT terminal networks are to become tomorrow's nationwide ATM/POS networks,
then they must have the capability to merge, or at least interchange
transactions. Legislators are recognizing that traditional restrictions
in geographical market areas and electronic financial services that
may be offered by financial institutions are not well suited to today's
environment. Regulators of the financial industry are reassessing
the applicability of the McFadden Act to today's financial service
needs; more liberal rules governing geographic limitations are likely
to be the long-term result. Federal legislation may also be forthcoming, enabling federally-chartered depository institutions to establish
and operate EFT/PEP terminal systems under uniform rules less
restrictive than those governing "brick-and-mortar" branches.
Electronic financial services present an opportunity for financial
and non-financial enterprises to offer new and exciting products to
their customers. The legal issues raised by this technology are not
adequately covered by existing laws. The law must be updated to
meet the needs of electronic banking.

